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Abstract—Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a general
cryptographic technique that allows distrusting parties to com-
pute a function of their individual inputs, while only revealing
the output of the function. It has found applications in areas
such as auctioning, email filtering, and secure teleconference.
Given its importance, it is crucial that the protocols are
specified and implemented correctly. In the programming lan-
guage community it has become good practice to use computer
proof assistants to verify correctness proofs. In the field of
cryptography, EasyCrypt is the state of the art proof assistant. It
provides an embedded language for probabilistic programming,
together with a specialized logic, embedded into an ambient
general purpose higher-order logic. It allows us to conveniently
express cryptographic properties. EasyCrypt has been used suc-
cessfully on many applications, including public-key encryption,
signatures, garbled circuits and differential privacy. Here we
show for the first time that it can also be used to prove security
of MPC against a malicious adversary.
We formalize additive and replicated secret sharing schemes
and apply them to Maurer’s MPC protocol for secure addition
and multiplication. Our method extends to general polynomial
functions. We follow the insights from EasyCrypt that security
proofs can be often be reduced to proofs about program
equivalence, a topic that is well understood in the verification
of programming languages. In particular, we show that in
the passive case the non-interference-based (NI) definition is
equivalent to a standard game-based security definition. For the
active case we provide a new NI definition, which we call input
independence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of multiparty computation started in the 1980s
with the work of Yao [30] and Goldreich et al. [18]. It has
since grown increasingly important and is starting to be used
in real-life applications such as auctioning [17], email filtering,
secure teleconference [23].
A widely used technique for constructing MPC protocols
is secret sharing [29, 11], a cryptographic primitive that
distributes a secret among several parties by providing each
party with a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed
by combining the shares belonging to a qualified subset of the
parties (i.e. parties that are allowed to learn the secret), while
other subsets of the parties will have no information on the
secret (even when combining their shares).
EasyCrypt [6, 5] has been used to verify cryptographic
primitives, and more recently to verify protocols by using
it’s built-in probabilistic While-language. While cryptography
papers usually provide a presentation of the algorithms in
pseudocode, EasyCrypt code of such a protocol is usually not
much longer, but has the benefit of being completely precise.
Moreover, a framework is being developed to tie EasyCrypt
into a fully verified tool chain to generate verified low level
code from the protocol definition [1] and thus obtain high
assurance cryptography.
A clear motivation for formal verification is given by
Bellare and Rogaway [8]: ‘In our opinion, many proofs in
cryptography have become essentially unverifiable. Our field
may be approaching a crisis of rigor.’ An example of the
usefulness of formal verification is provided by the vulner-
abilities in the Dual EC random bit generator, where the
correctness proof was flawed [19]. Any attempt to formalize
this argument would have spotted the gap in the proof. In
particular, an attacker that chooses the constants used in Dual
EC could potentially predict outputs and this way introduce a
backdoor into protocols using Dual EC such as TLS [16]. The
feasibility of verification is, for instance, demonstrated by the
subsequent verification of improved protocols for elliptic curve
cryptography [31]. Finally, formal verification is required to
obtain the highest assurance level (EAL7) in Common Criteria.
A. Our Contribution
• We provide security definitions and proofs for the MPC
protocol by Maurer [25]. This is the first formalized proof
for more than two parties and the first formalized proof
of a protocol that is actively secure.
• We have formalized these proofs in EasyCrypt, a tool
that has been used for cryptographic primitives, but only
recently also for protocols. A precise description of what
we have formalized is presented in section V-D.
We split the protocol into three phases: input, computation
and output, where the computation phase can potentially
consist of an arbitrary combination of additions and multipli-
cations. This standard approach allows us to treat arithmetic
circuits. Mathematically, one can see arithmetic circuits as a
way to represent multi-variate polynomials on the ring1 Zm,
and therefore, to represent any function over Zm.
We first discuss simulation-based security definitions for
passive and active security of MPC protocols. The use of
simulation-based notions is the standard approach in cryptog-
raphy for defining security of MPC protocols We then proceed
with new non-interference-based definitions that are tailored
specifically to the class of protocols we consider, and relate
1In the cryptographic literature, most MPC protocols rely on computation
over a field. In the case of our protocol, however, a ring is sufficient.
them to the simulation-based ones. In particular, we prove
that they imply the standard simulation-based cryptographic
definitions. In the passive case, non-interference is equivalent
to the existence of a simulator. Non-interference (NI) is
especially suitable for the computer-aided proofs presented
in EasyCrypt, where the probabilistic relational Hoare logic
presents a solid foundation for proving non-interference based
statements. A simulation-based proof would proceed by con-
sidering an equivalence between a program and a simulator,
which are structurally different, whereas NI considers two runs
of the same program. In the active case, this difference is even
bigger because in the security definition the simulator does
not obtain the protocol output in advance. The feasibility of
using non-interference for cryptography is known and was e.g.
studied by Backes and Pfitzmann [3]. In the case of EasyCrypt,
the benefits were emphasized, in a different context, in a work
on masking schemes by Barthe et al. [4]. NI is a compositional
property, which allows us to build modular proofs.
An important motivation for our work is provided by the
EasyCrypt formalization of Boolean garbled circuits [1]. It
provides high assurance crypto, a completely verified tool
chain starting from a readable EasyCrypt protocol to verified
low level code. We hope to profit from the same technology
in the future. Garbled circuits provide a framework for se-
cure 2-party computation, a technique complementary to the
techniques we use here.
B. Outline
Section III contains background on secure multi-party compu-
tation. Section IV contrasts non-interference based definitions
with simulation based ones. Section V discusses our modelling
of Maurer’s description of active security for the addition
protocol. Section VI discusses related work and Section VII
concludes.
The sources are available at
http://users-cs.au.dk/spitters/MPCEC/. The implementation
compiles with the development version of EasyCrypt available
from https://github.com/EasyCrypt/easycrypt.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We will use x to denote a
vector (x1, . . . , xn) and xi for its ith projection. Conveniently,
almost all vectors in this paper have the same length. Let
x ← D denote the sampling of an element x according to
some distribution D, and let x←$ S denote that x is sampled
from the uniform distribution over the finite set S. We fix an
integer m and consider the ring Zm.
We now want to compare the output distributions of two
executions of probabilistic algorithms.
Definition 1 (Perfect indistinguishability). Let U(x) and V (x)
be the output distribution of probabilistic algorithm U and
V , respectively, on input x. Then U and V are perfectly
indistinguishable (denoted U ∼p V ) if for all inputs x,
U(x) = V (x).
A. Secret Sharing
Here we recall the definitions of additive, replicated, and
verifiable secret sharing schemes from [25]. The definitions
build on top of each other: The verifiable secret sharing
scheme combines replicated secret sharing with additional
communication, and replicated secret sharing uses additive
secret sharing internally. Looking ahead, we want to state
the definition of our replicated and verifiable secret sharing
scheme for the special secrecy structure2 with privacy against
a single party3. I.e. let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of parties,
then for each i ∈ [n] {Pi} is in the secrecy structure Σ. The
replicated secret sharing scheme with this access structure
requires the underlying additive secret sharing scheme to
provide privacy against any set of n − 1 colluding parties.
Throughout this work, we will refer to the party that creates
a secret sharings as the dealer (of the corresponding secret).
a) Additive Secret Sharing.: The additive secret sharing
scheme for n parties consist of a pair of algorithms:
ASS = (SHARE,RECONSTRUCT),
which are defined as follows:
Sharing: The ASS.SHARE algorithm on input a secret
s ∈ Zp, samples n − 1 values a1, . . . , an−1 and com-
putes an = s −
∑n−1
i=1 ai. Then it outputs the shares
(a1, . . . , an).
Reconstruct: The ASS.RECONSTRUCT algorithm on in-
put a sharing (a1, . . . , an), computes and outputs s =∑n
i=1 ai.
b) Replicated Secret Sharing.: The replicated secret shar-
ing scheme for n parties consist of a pair of algorithms:
RepSS = (SHARE,RECONSTRUCT),
which are defined as follows:
Sharing: The RepSS.SHARE algorithm on input a se-
cret s ∈ Zp, runs the additive sharing algorithm
(a1, . . . , an) ← ASS.SHARE(s). Then it constructs for
all i ∈ [n]
ri = (a1, . . . , ai−1,⊥, ai+1, . . . , an)
Finally it outputs the shares (r1, . . . , rn).
Reconstruct: The RepSS.RECONSTRUCT algorithm
takes a sharing (r1, . . . , rn), extract the additive sharing
(a1, . . . , an) and outputs
s = ASS.RECONSTRUCT(a1, . . . , an)
c) Verifiable Secret Sharing.: The verifiable secret shar-
ing scheme for n parties consist of two protocols VSS =
(SHARE,RECONSTRUCT), which are defined as follows:
Sharing: The VSS.SHARE protocol proceeds as follows
2Secrecy structure: the collection of ignorant party subsets, i.e., it contains
all subsets of the parties that cannot learn anything about the secret.
3However, this can easily be extended to corruption of more parties by
adapting the secret sharing schemes to the corresponding secrecy structure.
See [25] for details.
1) The dealer shares their secret s ∈ Zp using the
replicated sharing algorithm
(r1, . . . , rn)← RepSS.SHARE(s)
i.e., party Pi receives the share
ri = (a1, . . . , ai−1,⊥, ai+1, . . . , an).
2) For each i ∈ [n], each pair of parties in P \ {Pi}
check whether they received the same value for
ai. If any inconsistency is detected, the players
broadcast a complaint.
3) The dealer broadcasts all the shares for which a
majority of parties raised a complaint. The other
parties accept these broadcasted values. If the dealer
refuses to broadcast any of the requested shares, the
protocol aborts.
Reconstruct: The VSS.RECONSTRUCT proceeds as fol-
lows
1) Party Pi knows share ri for all i ∈ [n].
2) All parties send their share to all other parties such
that each party knows r1, . . . , rn.
3) Now each party obtained n − 1 copies of ai (the
underlying additive share). Each party locally does
a majority vote and takes the value that occurs more
than half of the time.
4) After the majority vote each party knows a1, . . . , an
and can reconstruct the secret using additive secret
sharing
s = ASS.RECONSTRUCT(a1, . . . , an)
1) Properties: All three secret sharing schemes in this
section have the following properties:
a) Correctness: Let s ∈ Zp be a secret. Then
RECONSTRUCT(SHARE(s)) = s.
b) Secrecy: Let s1 and s2 be secret sharings of two
secrets:
(a11, . . . , a
1
n)← SHARE(s1), (a
2
1, . . . , a
2
n)← SHARE(s2),
where party Pi knows shares a
1
i and a
2
i . Then for all i, a
1
i ∼
p
a2i .
Both additive and replicated secret sharing schemes can
be seen as passively secure secret sharing schemes as they
only provide correctness guarantees against an honest dealer.
Verifiable secret sharings on the other hand ensures that
the dealer’s sharing is consistent among parties and hence
guarantees correctness against a malicious dealer.
2) Linearity of the Secret Sharing Schemes: The three
secret sharing schemes in this section are all linear secret
sharing schemes. Let s1 and s2 be secret sharings of two
secrets:
(a11, . . . , a
1
n)← SHARE(s1), (a
2
1, . . . , a
2
n)← SHARE(s2),
where party Pi knows shares a
1
i and a
2
i . The parties can
compute the secret sharing of the sum s1+s2 by performing a
linear operation on the shares that they know. E.g. for additive
secret sharing this operation is the addition of the known
shares:
rsi = a
1
i + a
2
i for i ∈ [n].
Then s1 + s2 = RECONSTRUCT(rs1, . . . , rsn).
III. MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
In multi-party computation, n parties wish to compute a deter-
ministic function f of their secret inputs. For the rest of this
work, we fix a (deterministic) function f : X1×· · ·×Xn → Y ,
and hence assume for simplicity that all parties obtain the same
output4. The goal is to compute y = f(x), while ensuring that
the following security requirements are fulfilled:
• Correctness: The correct value of the output y is com-
puted.
• Privacy: The output y is the only new information that
can be derived from the computation.
To achieve this goal, the parties use a probabilistic protocol pi
to compute y.
a) The adversarial model.: When talking about security
of a multi-party computation protocol, we need to consider
the power of the adversary. In our setting, we consider static
corruption, where the corrupted parties are determined before
the protocol execution. Furthermore, we consider two types
of adversarial behavior: passive and active corruption, which
specify the actions the corrupted parties are allowed to take.
• In the passive model, the adversary is assumed to follow
the protocol description, but attempts to learn more than
the output from the protocol execution, i.e., tries to
learn information that should remain private. This is also
known as security against semi-honest or honest-but-
curious adversaries.
• In the active model, the adversary is allowed to deviate
from the protocol description arbitrarily. This is also
known as security against malicious adversaries.
Moreover, we assume that the adversary is stateful, i.e. the
adversary can maintain an internal state to log the transcript
of the protocol etc.
A. The Protocol
We consider the MPC protocol presented by Maurer [25]
which provides active security under corruption of t < n/3
parties. The protocol is based on verifiable secret sharing and
computes a public function of the n parties’ inputs that is
represented as arithmetic circuit. The protocol consists of three
phases: An input phase, where each of the n parties’ secret
inputs is shared using verifiable secret sharing; the compu-
tation phase, where the parties perform computations on the
shares; and finally, the output phase, where each party opens
their share of the result, thus allowing everyone to locally
reconstruct the result. Evaluating an arithmetic circuit requires
additions and multiplications. Like in many other contexts,
multiplication is significantly harder to achieve than addition.
4Different outputs for the parties can be obtained by opening outputs only
to certain parties.
In our case, the linearity of the secret sharing scheme provides
a way of locally adding secret sharings, while multiplication
requires further communication. For simplicity, we focus on
the case of corruption of a single party.
The protocol assumes synchronous communication and the
existence of private authenticated communication channels
between parties as well as an authenticated broadcast channel.
Even though the broadcast channel can be simulated, we
will use this abstraction to ease readability. Furthermore, the
adversary is allowed to be rushing, i.e. in each communication
step, the adversary can see all the communication from all
honest parties before sending its own.
We will now describe the phases of the protocol:
Input: Each party performs a verifiable secret sharing
of their secret input (as described in Section II-A). These
shares are distributed s.t. party Pj receives the j’th shares
of each secret. At the end of the phase, each party
is committed to an input, i.e. this input is uniquely
determined from the other parties’ combined shares. The
following matrix represents the knowledge of one party.
Each row i stands for the share received from party Pi.

a11 a
1
2 · · · ⊥ · · · a
1
n
a21 a
2
2 · · · ⊥ · · · a
2
n
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
an1 a
n
2 · · · ⊥ · · · a
n
n


Computation: The parties can now compute on shared
values:
Addition: Since the secret sharing scheme is linear,
the parties can compute a secret sharing of the sum of
any number of shared values by locally adding their
shares. E.g. given n shares of values represented as
matrix of shares, party Pi will collapse each column
by adding the values:
ssj = a
1
j + a
2
j + · · ·+ a
n
j for j ∈ [n] s.t. j 6= i
This provides party Pi with the i’th share of the sum
of the secret inputs
rsi = (ss1, . . . , ssi−1,⊥, ssi+1, . . . , ssn).
Multiplication: In order to multiply two secret
shared values, the parties need to communicate and
to introduce fresh randomness. Each party Pi knows
the i-th share of two shared values a and b:[
a1 a2 · · · ⊥ · · · an
b1 b2 · · · ⊥ · · · bn
]
Note now that a · b =
∑
i,j aibj , meaning that if
each party knows a secret sharing of each term aibj ,
then they can compute a · b by (locally) adding the
sharings of all terms.
The parties proceed as follows to compute a secret
sharing of term aibj : First, each of the n − 2 (or
n − 1 if i = j) parties that knows both ai and
bj will compute a fresh secret sharing of aibj .
In a next step, the parties check if all sharings
are sharings of the same value by first computing
the pairwise differences between two sharings and
then opening and reconstructing the difference. If
all differences are 0, then the parties choose the
sharing of an arbitrary party as sharing of aibj . If
any of the opened differences is different from 0,
then the parties will compute a secret sharing of
aibj in the following way: Each party that knows
ai reports their value of ai to all other parties. Each
party sets ai to be the majority over all received
values for ai. The parties do the same for bj . Then,
each party sets the additive sharing of the term aibj
to be (aibj , 0, . . . , 0), computes the corresponding
replicated secret sharing, and stores its share of it.
Output: Each party opens their share rsi of the result
by sending it to all other parties. This allows everyone to
locally reconstruct the sum y of the secret inputs:
y = VSS.RECONSTRUCT(rs1, . . . , rsn).
For simplicity, we will consider two kinds of protocol, with
a single addition and multiplication, resp., as computation
phase. They will be referred to as addition and multiplication
protocol, respectively.
B. Passive Security
This section presents a definition of passive security against
one corrupt party following the simulation paradigm, the
current standard approach for defining security of MPC pro-
tocols [18].
In the setting of passive security, the adversary must follow
the protocol description (i.e. the adversary must use his desig-
nated input and must send the correct messages). This might
seem like a very weak security model, since it does not capture
even small deviations from the protocol description. However,
it guarantees that the protocol does not leak any information
inadvertently (i.e. that an honest-but-curious adversary does
not learn unwanted information from the transcript of the
protocol). Another way of interpreting passive security is that
it provides security against corruption after the execution of
the protocol, i.e. what honest parties learned and stored during
the protocol execution does not leak information.
The goal is to ensure that the adversary only learns the
output of the computation, which means that everything it
sees during the execution can be computed based on its
input and the output. This property is proved by building a
simulator. This simulator is given the input and output of
the corrupt party and computes a view (or transcript) that
is indistinguishable from the adversary’s view in the real
execution of the protocol.
Definition 2 (View and output). Let pi be a protocol for
computing f . We define the view of a party as all the messages
sent and received by this party during the protocol execution,
i.e., we can denote the view of party Pi by
viewpii (x)
def
= (xi,m
(1)
i , . . . ,m
(t)
i ),
where m
(j)
i denote the jth message sent or received by party
Pi. Furthermore, we denote the common output of all parties
by
outputpi(x).
Note that we are considering the setting of deterministic
functions (like addition and multiplication) and corruption of
a single party. This means that for passive security, we can
consider the correctness and privacy separately [20, Chapter
2].
Definition 3 (Perfect Passive Simulation-based Security, [20]).
We say that an n-party protocol pi securely computes f in the
presence of static semi-honest adversaries, if
Correctness: For every x ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn,
P[outputpi(x) = f(x)] = 1.
Privacy: For all i ∈ [n], and for all adversaries that
passive corrupts party Pi, there exists a polynomial-time
simulator Si such that
{Si (xi, f(x))}
x
∼p {viewpii (x)}x
where x ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn.
C. Active Security
In this section, we discuss the existing cryptographic def-
inition of active security for MPC based on the ideal-real
world model. We present a natural extension of the two-party
definition by Hazay and Lindell [20] to the case of n parties.5
Active security models the setting where a malicious (or
actively corrupt) party may follow any strategy (including
arbitrarily deviating from the protocol description). Thus, it
is insufficient to consider the adversary’s view in the protocol
based on its input and output (like in the passive case). This
is especially important given that the adversary may try to
change its input during the protocol execution, make the
output be incorrectly distributed, or make the honest parties
output different or incorrect values (to mention a few possible
strategies).
To capture these threats, we consider the ideal-real world
model, where we compare the real execution of the protocol
with an ideal execution that is secure by definition. In the ideal
execution, the computation is performed by a trusted party T .
This party is incorruptible and acts as a black-box such that
no one can observe or influence the computation performed
by this trusted party. This means that the only “attack” we
allow the adversary to perform is input substitution, i.e., the
only thing the adversary is able to do is to change its “given”
input to something else while this new input cannot depend
on the inputs of the honest parties (since the adversary in
the ideal execution receives no information before having to
commit to its input). Intuitively, security is shown by providing
a simulator (with access to the real-world adversary) that when
5Note that this extension is restricted to our setting of perfect security in
the case of one corrupted party. However, this can be extended to corruption
of several parties.
interacting with T in the ideal world will produce the same
output distribution as in the real world. Note that this definition
captures both correctness and privacy of a protocol: Privacy
follows from the simulation paradigm and correctness from
the fact that the ideal model always outputs the correct result.
We remark that we consider the setting of one corrupt
party to match the setting used in the rest of the paper.
However, the definition can easily be extended to a setting of
several corrupted parties. In the information-theoretic setting
that we consider in this work, protocols can achieve active
security under corruption of at most t < n/2 parties assuming
broadcast (depending on the protocol) [27]. However, Maurer’s
protocol allows only for t < n/3, even with broadcast [25].
Like in the setting of passive security, our definitions work
for both polynomially bounded and unbounded simulators.
a) Notation.: Let P1, . . . , Pn be n parties, and let A
denote the adversary that decides to corrupt party Pa with
a ∈ [n]. Let T be a trusted party that on inputs x correctly
computes f(x).
b) Ideal Model.: In this model each party sends their
input to a trusted party T that computes the function f and
returns the result to the parties.
Input: Let xi be the input of party Pi for i ∈ [n].
Send inputs: The honest parties Pi for i ∈ [n] \ {a}
send their inputs xi to the trusted party T . The corrupt
party Pa sends its prescribed input xa, some other input,
or a special abort symbol ⊥ to the trusted party T . This
decision is made by the adversary A and may depend on
xa and the adversary’s internal state.
Let x′ denote the inputs that T receives, where x′i = xi
for all i 6= a.
Receive outputs: If x′i = ⊥ (the abort symbol) for some
i ∈ [n], then T informs all parties that the protocol aborts
by sending ⊥ to all parties. Otherwise, the trusted party
T computes y = f(x′), and sends y to all parties.
Output: The honest parties output y, while the adversary
A outputs an arbitrary function g of the prescribed input
xa of the corrupts party and the value y obtained from
the trusted party (i.e g(xa, y)).
Let IDEALf,A,a(x) denote the output of the ideal execution.
This is an n-tuple containing the honest parties’ outputs y and
the output of the adversary A from the above ideal execution
IDEALf,A,a(x) := (y1, . . . , yn)
where ya = g(xa, y) and yi = y for i ∈ [n] \ {a}
c) Real Model.: A real execution of the protocol pi (with
no trusted party). In this case, the adversary A sends all
messages on behalf of the corrupt party Pa and may follow an
arbitrary strategy. The honest parties must follow the protocol
description.
Let REALpi,A,a(x) denote the output tuple containing the
honest parties’ outputs and the output of the adversary A from
the real execution of pi.
Definition 4 (Perfect Active Simulation-based Security, [20]).
Let pi be a n-party protocol that computes f . Protocol pi is
said to securely compute f in the presence of static malicious
adversaries, if for every adversary A for the real model, there
exists an polynomial-time adversary S (called a simulator) for
the ideal model, such that for every a ∈ [n]
{IDEALf,S,a(x)}
x
∼p {REALpi,A,a(x)}
x
where xi ∈ Xi for i ∈ [n].
d) Input extraction: Any protocol satisfying Definition 4
must allow the simulator to extract the input of corrupt parties
from the messages they send (up to equivalence, i.e. inputs
that lead to the same output). The reason is that in the real
world, the simulator can only get the output that an adversary
would see from the ideal functionality by using the adversary’s
input. Hence, in a protocol that outputs the correct result, it
must be possible to extract the adversary’s input.
IV. MODELLING PRIVACY AS INPUT-INDEPENDENCE
In this section, we present new security definitions against
both passive and active corruption where privacy is based
on input-independence, and prove that these new definitions
imply the simulation-based definitions from Section III. These
definitions will allow us to prove active security of Maurer’s
protocol in EasyCrypt in Section V.
In the following sections, we redefine security using a non-
interference-based strategy instead of a simulation-based def-
inition, i.e., we compare the adversary’s view in two different
executions of the protocol under conditions that rule out trivial
distinguishability. Input-independence then means that the
adversary, given only its input and the output of computation,
cannot distinguish which of all possible consistent inputs of
the honest parties was used.
A. Input-independence
Input independence is the non-interference property of proto-
cols where the view of a party in the protocol is independent
of the other parties’ inputs. In our setting, this property will
only hold only under the side condition that the inputs of the
other parties must be consistent (i.e. the two executions of the
protocol must lead to the same output).
Definition 5 (Non-interference). An n-party protocol pi enjoys
non-interference if for all i ∈ [n], we have that for all inputs
x,x′ ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn related under some condition Ci(x,x
′),
then it holds that
{viewpii (x)}x ∼
p {viewpii (x
′)}
x
′ .
The definition states that given two sets of inputs that are
related under some condition, then party Pi cannot distinguish
between the two executions of the protocol (i.e. party Pi’s view
in the two executions are indistinguishable).
Looking ahead, we will model the view of the adversary
in EasyCrypt using the global state of the adversary (glob A).
Thus, given an adversary that corrupts party Pi, we can express
the non-interference property in EasyCrypt pseudocode as
follows
equiv [ pi ∼ pi : ={glob A} ∧ Ci =⇒ ={glob A}]
The condition ={glob A} means that the global state of the
adversary before the two executions of pi are equal, while after
the executions we have equality over the distribution of the
adversary’s global state.
B. Passive security
Passive security will be defined again as two properties of
a protocol pi: correctness and privacy. However, we define the
privacy property now as an input-independence property.
Recall that viewpii (x) denotes the view of party Pi in the
execution of the protocol on inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn), and
that outputpi(x) denotes the common output of all parties.
For the privacy property in this definition, we will fix the
input of the corrupt party to be the same in both executions.
The inputs of the honest parties are chosen consistently such
that the output of the computation is the same in both
executions. Then input-independence means that the view of a
corrupt party is independent of the actual inputs of the honest
parties as long as they lead to the same output.
Definition 6 (Perfect Passive NI-based Security). We say that
an n-party protocol pi securely computes f in the presence of
static semi-honest adversaries if
Correctness: For every x ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn,
P[outputpi(x) = f(x)] = 1.
Privacy: For all i ∈ [n], and for all adversaries that
passively corrupt party Pi, we have that for all inputs x,
x
′ ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn such that xi = x
′
i (fixed input for
the corrupt party) and f(x) = f(x′), then it holds that
{viewpii (x)}x ∼
p {viewpii (x
′)}
x
′
Equivalence between the definitions.: We will now prove
that the presented non-interference-based definition is equiv-
alent to the simulation-based definition for perfect passive
security.
Theorem 1. Let f be an efficiently invertible function and let
pi be an n-party protocol that computes f . Then pi is perfect
passive simulation-based secure if and only if pi is perfect
passive NI-based secure.
Proof. Both definitions consist of two parts, correctness and
privacy. As correctness is defined the same in both definitions,
we only consider the privacy part of the definitions.
Let pi have perfect passive security under the NI definition.
Let Pi be the corrupt party. Then by definition, there exists
inputs x,x′ ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn with xi = x
′
i and f(x) = f(x
′),
such that the protocol execution on these inputs produce
equally distributed views. Hence, a simulator with input xi
and y = f(x) can invert f for fixed xi to obtain inputs
x′1, . . . , x
′
i−1, x
′
i+1, . . . , x
′
n (with x
′
j possible different from
xj for j 6= i) for the honest parties. Then the simulator can
construct a view by simulating the protocol pi on inputs x′
with x′i = xi.
For the other direction, let pi have perfect passive security
under the simulation-based definition. Let Pi be the corrupt
party and let x,x′ ∈ X1 × · · · × Xn such that xi = x
′
i and
f(x) = f(x′). Then by definition, there exists a simulator Si
such that
{Si(xi, f(x))}
x
∼p {viewpii (x)}x
and
{Si(x
′
i, f(x
′))}
x
′ ∼
p {viewpii (x
′)}
x
′ .
Since xi = x
′
i and f(x) = f(x
′), we have
{Si(xi, f(x))}
x
∼p {Si(x
′
i, f(x
′))}
x
′
and hence
{viewpii (x)}x ∼
p {viewpii (x
′)}
x
′
by transitivity of ∼p.
Note that the class of functions f that can be consid-
ered in the previous theorem can be extended if one al-
lows computationally unbounded simulation: Given a func-
tion f , f(x), and xi, an unbounded simulator can find
x′1, . . . , x
′
i−1, x
′
i+1, . . . , x
′
n (with x
′
j possible different from xj
for j 6= i) such that f(x) = f(x′).
The EasyCrypt formulation of NI-based security lemma for
the passive case is
equiv [ pi ∼ pi :
={glob A, advid}
∧ s{1}.[advid{1}] = s{2}.[advid{2}]
∧ sum s{1} = sum s{2}
=⇒
={glob A} ]
where N denotes the number of parties in the protocol.
C. Active Security
In this section, we redefine the definition of active security
as three properties that a protocol must follow, and show that
these properties imply simulation-based active security. This
is the definition that will be used in Section V.
A simulation-based proof of active security would proceed
by considering an equivalence between pi and a simulator.
However, non-interference properties are more amenable to
computer-aided proofs, because the two runs of the same
program are structurally the same. This is especially important
in the active case: Note that the simulator does not receive the
adversary’s secret protocol input as input, but must extract
it (in our case from the communication between corrupt
and honest parties). As a simulator must start to interact
consistently with the adversary without knowledge of the
inputs of any party or the protocol output, the protocol and
the simulator will have to differ more.
EasyCrypt does support game hopping proofs using simu-
lators though; see e.g. Barthe et al. [5]. However, our imple-
mentation of Maurer’s multiplication protocol takes roughly
500LOC, so a game hopping proof would require many large
intermediate protocols and hence much code duplication.
Let pi be an n-party protocol that computes f . We assume
for the rest of this work that pi can be split into three
phases: input, computation, and output, where the output phase
consists of a single round of communication. Let pi1 denote
the combined input and computation phase, and let pi2 denote
the output phase such that pi = pi2 ◦ pi1. Let view
pi1
i (x)
denote the view of party Pi in the execution of pi1, and let
outputpi(x) = (y1, . . . , yn) denote the output of all parties
after the execution of the protocol pi.
Input extraction: We define an extraction function to be
used in the security definition: Let v = viewpi1i (x) be the
view of party Pi after the execution of pi1 (the input and
computation phase). Then there exists a polynomial-time input
extraction function
xi ← ini(v)
that takes a view of Pi after execution of pi1 and outputs party
Pi’s committed input (i.e. the input Pi decided to use during
pi1)
Note that the extraction function ini extracts the input
that the adversary is committed to after the input phase.
The adversary may start with an input and change it during
the input phase. After that phase, however, the adversary is
committed to an input. In Maurer’s protocol, this is the case
because of the shares it sent to the honest parties, i.e. the shares
that the honest parties received determine the adversary’s input
uniquely.
Definition 7 (Perfect Active NI-based Security). Let pi = pi2 ◦
pi1 be a protocol that computes f .
Protocol pi is said to securely compute f in the presence
of static malicious adversaries if for all a ∈ [n] and for
every adversaryA that actively corrupts party Pa, the protocol
fulfills the following properties:
Correctness: Let x ∈ X1× · · ·×Xn be the inputs to the
execution and let v = viewpi1a (x) be the view of corrupt
party Pa after the execution of pi1. Let output
pi(x) =
(y1, . . . , yn) be the output of the protocol pi, then for all
i ∈ [n] with i 6= a we have
P[yi = f(x
′)] = 1
where x′a = ina(v) (the committed input for the corrupt
party) and x′j = xj for all j 6= a (the honest parties
inputs).
Input Independence: For all inputs x,x′ ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn
with xa = x
′
a (fixed input for the corrupt party),
{viewpi1a (x)}x ∼
p {viewpi1a (x
′)}
x
.
Output Simulation: Let x ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn be the inputs
to the execution and let v = viewpi1a (x) be the view of
party Pa after the execution of pi1. Then let y = f(x
′),
where x′a = ina(v) and x
′
i = xi for all i 6= a. We say
that the output phase pi2 preserves privacy if the final
messages {mi}i6=a sent by the honest parties only depend
on the view v and the result y, and moreover, they can
be computed efficiently. I.e. the final messages follow an
efficiently samplable distribution on v and y
{mi}i6=a ← Dv,y.
NI-based implies simulation-based security: Next, we prove
that the above NI-based definition implies the standard
simulation-based definition. In fact, the NI-based definition
is greatly inspired by a widely used strategy to construct
simulators for the specific kind of protocol we have in mind.
The runtime of the simulator that we construct in the
proof depends on the runtime of input extraction and output
simulation. Since both are possible in polynomial-time, then
the simulator will run in polynomial-time as well.
Theorem 2. Let pi = pi2 ◦pi1 be a n-party protocol computing
f . If pi is perfect active NI-based secure, then there exists
a simulator S such that pi is perfect active simulation-based
secure.
Proof. We start from a real protocol execution and argue about
a simulation strategy. In the simulation-based security defini-
tion, there exists a simulator that has to simulate messages sent
by the honest parties without knowing their inputs. Moreover,
this simulator has oracle access to a trusted party T that knows
the honest parties’ inputs. Therefore, the general simulation
strategy is to extract the adversary’s committed input from the
messages he sends during pi1. Then the simulator can query the
trusted party for the correct output. Given this, the simulator
can compute the final messages sent by the honest parties in
the output phase.
We have to argue now that this strategy is feasible given a
protocol with the properties stated above as well as that the
strategy is indistinguishable from a real protocol execution to
the adversary. We construct the following simulator:
Simulator S:
1) Run pi1 with the adversary while simulating the honest
parties with default inputs (e.g., xi = 0 for all i 6= a).
Let v = viewpi1a (x) be the view of the corrupt party
Pa after the execution of pi1 (i.e., all communication
between the corrupt party and the simulator).
2) Extract the input x′a that the adversary is committed to
after the input phase as x′a = ina(v). Send x
′
a to the
trusted party T to obtain the output y.
3) Sample the messages that the honest parties send in the
output phase as {mi}i6=a ← Dv,y .
We can now show that a protocol execution simulated with
S is indistinguishable from a real protocol execution. Input
independence implies that the adversary’s view after pi1 is
independent of the honest parties’ inputs. In particular, no
adversary can distinguish between a view from executing pi1
with real inputs for the honest parties from one with inputs 0
for all honest parties. Hence, the adversary can not distinguish
between the real execution and the simulated execution of pi1.
Then, the simulator gathers the view of the corrupt party
v = viewpi1a (x), and sends x
′
a = ina(v) to the trusted party
T . The trusted party computes and returns y = f(x′), where
x
′
i = xi for all i 6= a, i.e., the real inputs of the honest
parties. Thus, the simulator gets the correct output because of
the correctness property of the protocol.
Finally, output simulation guarantees that the final messages
the honest parties send in the output phase only depend on the
view v of the corrupt party after pi1 and the correct output of
the protocol y. Thus, the simulator can sample these messages
{mi}i6=a according to the distribution Dv,y . The adversary
knows the final message ma that it is supposed to send in
the output phase since ma is uniquely determined by its
view in the protocol. Thus, given the messages {mi}i∈[n], the
adversary can compute the correct output y. Furthermore, the
adversary learns no more than the output, since the messages
sent by the simulator (on behalf of the honest parties) only
depend on the output and the adversary’s view after pi1
(which did not reveal any information about the honest parties
inputs).
Remark: The other direction, from simulation-based se-
curity to NI-based security, does not hold in general as the
simulator may use a simulation strategy that is incompatible
with the NI-definition.
V. MODELLING IN EASYCRYPT
A. EasyCrypt
EasyCrypt is a proof assistant for verifying the security
of cryptographic constructions in the computational model.
EasyCrypt provides a simple imperative probabilistic program-
ming language pWhile to specify protocols.
As an example of EasyCrypt code, consider the additive
sharing protocol consisting of share and reconstruct proce-
dures.
proc share_additive(s : zmod) : zmod list =
{ var mxrd;
mxrd <$ dlist dzmod (N-1);
return (s - sum mxrd) :: mxrd;}
proc reconstruct_additive (sx : zmod list) : zmod =
{ return sum sx; }
Here mxrd <$ dlist dzmod (N-1) samples from a uniform
distribution on lists over zmod of size N − 1.
Proving is done using a variety of (probabilistic relational)
Hoare logics. Mathematical functions and data types are
defined using an ambient higher order logic and a functional
programming language. EasyCrypt has both tactic based in-
teractive proofs, but also automatic proofs, using an SMT
backend.
Modelling and proving is done in two ways. When dealing
with honest parties, we tend to use functional programs, so-
called operators, and use the ambient logic to reason about
these programs. Adversarial code is treated using a module
system and procedure calls. One specifies the module type of
the adversarial code, and proves properties over all possible
instances of this module type. The module system is connected
to the imperative pWhile language6, so we reason in the
corresponding Hoare logic. Usually, the main effort is to find
the correct pre- and post-conditions and loop invariants. Often
we are arguing that the adversary is harmless in certain parts
6The choice for an imperative probabilistic language is not forced. One
could also use a functional probabilistic programming language, such as
Rml, instead of pWhile. Rml used in the ALEA Coq-library [2], the base
for CertiCrypt [7], the predecessor of EasyCrypt. However, such a functional
language is not implemented in EasyCrypt.
of the protocol. The way to specify this is via the equivalence
of adversarial (imperative) code and functional code. This kind
of reasoning is familiar in program correctness.
B. Modelling the Protocol
In this section we discuss how to model Maurer’s MPC
protocol [25] and prove active security.
a) Adversary and phases: Recall that a malicious adver-
sary can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol, e.g., by sending
wrong or malformed messages or aborting the protocol. To
model these arbitrary actions, we use the abstract module types
of EasyCrypt to provide an interface to the adversary, while at
the same allowing it to deviate from the protocol description.
Thus, for each stage in the protocol, whenever we want the
adversary to do some computation, send information, or re-
ceive information, we call the adversary’s abstract procedures.
E.g., in the output phase, we send the honest parties’ shares
of the result psums to the adversary and ask the adversary to
send his share to all other parties:
advc <@ A.bxshareofres(psums);
Note that according to the protocol description, the adversary
is supposed to send its share of the result to all other parties
(i.e., everyone should receive the same share). However, the
adversary has the power to send different and (possibly) wrong
shares to the other parties. We model this by letting the
adversary return a matrix advc, where row i is the share that
adversary sends to party Pi.
In this setting, we can present the general structure of the
three phases of the addition protocol in EasyCrypt code. Here
<@ denote a procedure call.
proc input(s : zmod list) : zmod matrix list = {
var shares;
(* Distribution of shares: *)
shares <@ do_sharing(s);
pshares ← distribute_shares shares;
(* - adversary receives shares from the honest
parties *)
A.recv_shares(pshares.[advid]);
(* Consistency check: *)
(* - collect the complaints *)
rx <@ verify_shares();
(* - adversary logs the requests since they are
public *)
A.recv_rx(rx);
(* - reply the complaints *)
bx <@ broadcast_shares(rx);
(* - adversary logs the broadcast values *)
A.recv_bx(bx);
(* - fix the parties’ views from the broadcast
values *)
pshares ← fix advid pshares bx;
return pshares;}
proc computation (pshares : zmod matrix list) : zmod
matrix = {
(* - notify the adversary about the start of the
phase *)
A.localsum();
(* - perform the local addition for the honest
parties *)
return mklocalsums advid pshares; }
proc output (psums : zmod matrix) : zmod list = {
var advc, advres, resshares;
(* - the adversary receives shares of the result
* from the honest parties and sends his own
share *)
advc <@ A.bxshareofres(psums);
resshares ←distribute_resshares advid advc psums;
(* - get the adversary’s result.. *)
advres <@ A.getres();
(* ... and return results of all parties *)
return reconstruct_vss advid advres resshares; }
The input and output phase for the multiplication protocol
are essentially the same. The computation phase looks as
follows. Importantly, the computation phase contains (a lot of)
communication which is modelled by matrices keeping track
of all messages that were sent and received.
proc multiplication (a, b : zmod matrix) : zmod
matrix = {
var known_shared_terms, shared_terms_rep,
sharedterms_rep_distr, opened_diff, sharedterms;
(* distribution of shared terms aibj *)
shared_terms_rep <@ mult_term_sharing(a,b);
sharedterms_rep_distr ← distribute_shared_terms
shared_terms_rep;
(* compute and open pairwise differences of term
sharings *)
opened_diff <@ mult_check_term_sharing (
sharedterms_rep_distr);
(* choose sharing for each term *)
sharedterms <@ mult_determine_term_sharing (a,b,
sharedterms_rep_distr, opened_diff);
(* add all terms: *)
(* - rearrange for convenience *)
known_shared_terms ← rearrange_sharedterms
sharedterms;
(* - inform adversary of local computation *)
A.localmultsum();
(* - add term sharings *)
return mklocalsums_M ((N-1)*N)
known_shared_terms;}
Here advid is the id of the party corrupted by the adversary.
b) Communication: EasyCrypt has no native support for
communication. However, the logic and the module system are
rich enough to express this. We use lists and matrices to keep
track of the messages that are sent. To model the communica-
tion with the adversary, we specify abstract procedures to both
send and receive messages. The EasyCrypt logic keeps track
of the global state of the adversary. In the example above,
pshares is the knowledge that each party has. The various
calls to A are used to send/receive information to/from the
adversary, using EasyCrypt’s stateful modules.
c) Notes on the implementation: We note that this im-
plementation has a few limitations regarding the power of the
malicious adversary compared to the more general description
by Maurer.
We consider a setting where the adversary can only abort
during the input phase. Since we consider a protocol that is
secure in the presence of an honest majority, the information
shared by the honest parties after a successful input phase will
be enough to compute the result of the protocol. This means
that if the adversary aborts during the output phase, then the
honest parties will still be able to reconstruct the result of the
computation.
Another limitation is that in the input phase, the adversary
is forced to send shares of its secret before it can see the
shares of the honest parties secret. This might seem to limit
the adversary’s power of choosing its input based on this extra
information. However, the adversary is only committed to an
input at the end of the phase. Since the adversary’s initial
shares cannot be forced to be consistent, during the consistency
check, the adversary can still change the shares of its input,
which will allow to change its input to something else (that
possibly depends on the information received so far).
d) Extraction: As mentioned in Section III-C and IV-C,
a proof of active security requires the extraction of information
from the adversary’s communication. In particular, we can
extract the adversary’s input and share of the output it is
supposed to have from the messages that he sends and receives
in the input phase.
The input extractor extract collects all messages that the
adversary sent to honest parties(in our case, all other parties)
during the input phase, and uses their shares as shares of the
adversary’s input. These shares can now be used to reconstruct
the input. The verifiable secret sharing guarantees here that all
honest parties received consistent shares that when combined
reconstruct to the uniquely determined value that the adversary
is committed to after the input phase.
op extract (advid : int) (pview : zmod matrix3) =
col N advid pview.
e) High level structure: The whole protocol is then as
follows. pi1 consists of the input and computation phase.
Protocol consists of pi1 and the output phase. For the
purpose of our proofs, the protocol also calls the extrac-
tor extract_advinpsx and then stores an updated input list
secrets.
proc pi1 (s : zmod list) : zmod matrix list * zmod
matrix = {
var rinp, rcomp;
rinp <@ input (s);
rcomp <@ computation (rinp);
return (rinp, rcomp); }
proc protocol(s : zmod list) : zmod list = {
var inp, out;
(inp, comp) <@ pi1 (s);
(* input extraction *)
advinpsx ← mkaddshares (extract advid inp);
secrets ← s.[advid ← reconstruct advinpsx];
out <@ output (comp);
return out; }
C. Outline of the proof for active security
In this section, we present the key steps in proving ac-
tive security of Maurer’s protocol. This is done by proving
that the protocol fulfills the three properties in Definition 7:
correctness, input independence, and output simulation. We
will present each property in EasyCrypt code and provide an
overview of the proof. We use N in the implementation to
denote the number of parties. Furthermore, parties are indexed
from 0. The lemmas only hold as long as N ≥ 4, since
the reconstruction procedure of the verifiable secret sharing
scheme takes the majority over N − 1 values which is only
well-defined if there are at least 3 values to compare. advid
will denote the id of the adversary. The final messages that
the honest parties sent in the output phase are their shares of
the result, and these messages are denoted by comp.
Note that EasyCrypt cannot check the runtime of code.
However, it is easy to see that input extraction and output
simulation run in polynomial-time in our case.
1) Correctness: In order to state correctness, we first need
to define the inputs to the protocol. Honest parties will use the
inputs they were assigned to in the beginning. As mentioned
before, the adversary may change its mind about its input, but
only during the input phase. Afterwards, it is committed to a
unique input. Therefore, we extracted the shares advinpsx of
the input in protocol, and then define correctness with respect
to the updated input list secrets they define.
lemma correctness sx : hoare [ protocol :
sx = s ∧ size s = N ∧ 0 ≤ advid < N
=⇒
0 ≤ id < N ∧ id 6= advid ⇒
res.[id] = f secrets ].
For the input and output phase, correctness of the protocol
steps can be reduced to correctness of the secret sharing
scheme. For the computation phase, we prove that if the
inputs to a gate are secret sharings of secrets x1, . . . , xt (t
depends on the gate), then the output of the gate is a secret
sharing of the gate function on inputs x1, . . . , xt. For addition,
this property follows from linearity of the secret sharing
scheme. For multiplication, note that if (a0, . . . , aN−1) and
(b0, . . . , bN−1) are the additive secret sharings corresponding
to the replicated secret sharings of inputs a and b, then
a · b =
∑
i,j aibj . Since the secret sharing scheme is linear,
it is sufficient to prove that the secret sharing of any term
aibj that the parties agree on is actually a secret sharing of
the value ai · bj . In the multiplication protocol, all honest
parties that know ai and bj will output a secret sharing of
the value ai · bj , whereas the adversary (if involved, i.e. if
it knows both ai and bj) may output a secret sharing of an
arbitrary value. The subsequent check computes the pairwise
differences between those sharings. If all opened differences
are 0, then the presence of at least one honest party guarantees
that all secret sharings are sharings of the correct value ai · bj .
Otherwise, the replicated secret sharing corresponding to the
additive sharing (aibj, 0, . . . , 0) is a secret sharing of ai · bj .
2) Input Independence: After the execution of pi1 (i.e. the
input and computation phases), we show that the knowledge
(global state) of the adversary is independent of the inputs
of the honest parties, meaning that the adversary cannot
distinguish between two executions of pi1 with different inputs
for the honest parties.
lemma input_independence : equiv [ pi1 ∼ pi1 :
={glob A, advid}
∧ 0 ≤ advid{1} < N
∧ s{1}.[advid{1}] = s{2}.[advid{2}]
=⇒ ={glob A} ].
For the input phase, we prove input independence, which
follows from secrecy of the secret sharing scheme, and in-
tegrity of the output, i.e. each party knows the same ad-
ditive shares (except for the one they are not supposed to
know) of each shared input. Addition does not involve any
communication and hence preserves input independence. For
multiplication, we will consider again a term sharing aibj .
If this term sharing has input independence (with respect to
the honest parties’ inputs into the protocol), then the sum
of all term sharings will have this property as well, and so
will the output of a multiplication gate. Having the parties
output sharings of aibj preserves input independence because
of secrecy of the secret sharing scheme. Furthermore, all
honest parties that share a value for the current term will share
the same value. When computing and opening the pairwise
differences of the sharings, each difference will be 0 if and
only if the sharings that were compared are sharings of the
same value. In particular, if all sharings are sharings of the
same value, then all opened differences will be 0 in both
executions, and hence won’t provide an adversary with any
input-dependent knowledge. If not all differences are 0, then
one of the parties (the adversary) must have shared an incorrect
value, i.e. not aibj . In this case, the adversary must have
caused the opened difference to be different from 0 (and the
adversary knows this difference in advance). Since the whole
protocol so far was input independent, the opened differences
follow the same distribution in both executions, and hence
the check preserves input independence. In the final step, the
parties agree on a sharing of aibj . If all differences were 0,
then the parties will use the secret sharings of one of the
parties, which preserves input independence by secrecy of
the secret sharing scheme. Otherwise, the parties report their
values for ai and bj and compute a replicated secret sharing
from them. Again, this case can only occur if the adversary
knows both ai and bj , and hence this step preserves input
independence.
3) Output Simulation: The messages sent by the honest
parties in the beginning of the output phase will only reveal
the result of the computation. To prove this, we need to show
that these messages follow some distribution on the result and
the view of the adversary. This is proven by giving the exact
function that maps the result and the adversary’s view into the
messages the honest parties sent.
Here we note that these final messages are the honest par-
ties’ shares of the result, and the view of the adversary contains
its share of the result. From the definition of replicated secret
sharing, we notice that the adversary’s share of the result
contains N − 1 of the N additive shares that sum up to the
result. Thus, we can easily reconstruct the missing value, and
construct the honest parties replicated shares of the result.
op finalmsg (advid : int) (y : zmod) (pviewadv :
zmod list) : zmod matrix =
mkseq (fun i ⇒
mkseq (fun j ⇒
if i = advid then ⊥
else if i = j then ⊥
else if j = advid then y
- sum (drop_elem advid pviewadv)
else pviewadv.[j]) N) N.
lemma output_simulation : hoare [ protocol :
size s = N ∧ 0 ≤ advid < N
=⇒ finalmsg advid y advresshares = comp ].
D. The formalization
We have demonstrated how to formalize active security
of MPC protocols in EasyCrypt. We have done this by an
implementation of Maurer’s MPC protocol in EasyCrypt.
For the addition protocol, we have a complete proof for
the three properties correctness, output simulation and input
independence that are required by our non-interference based
security definition. We have extended this to the multiplication
protocol by identifying and formalizing all the invariants for
both privacy and correctness of the multiplication protocol,
and we have proved correctness, output simulation and input
independence. We have permitted ourselves the license not
to reprove some parts of the multiplication protocol that were
very similar to the addition protocol. The statements and proof
structure are very similar. However, refactoring all our code
to convince EasyCrypt of this fact does not seem to provide
enough insight to merit this effort. All these places are clearly
documented and marked with admit in the sources.
Our formalization is substantial: as a very rough measure, it
consists of approximately 5000LOC, 1800 of which are used
for the addition protocol. The code is dense, as it combines the
efficient ssreflect language with SMT-calls (for comparison,
the easycrypt standard library consists of 18000LOC).
More generally, we have given a methodology to attack
complex simulation-based proofs of protocols involving much
communication. We did this by translating simulation-based
proofs to NI-arguments and using the EasyCrypt module
system to model arbitrary adversarial code. Simulation-based
proofs are a standard technique in cryptography, but they
are difficult to make mathematically precise. A good exam-
ple is the ongoing effort to make the simulation-based UC
framework completely precise, e.g. discussed in [15]. The
framework is in general well understood, implementation in
a proof assistant is still lacking; see [13].
VI. RELATED WORK
EasyCrypt is a specialized proof assistant for security
proofs. To our knowledge, EasyCrypt is the only tool that
currently allows us to conveniently verify MPC protocols in
the manner that we did, since it combines a rich ambient
logic with an embedded logic for a probabilistic programming
language. However, EasyCrypt grew out of a Coq library [7]
and, in principle the techniques we present here could also be
used in other proof assistants for higher order logic, or type
theory, once one defines the programming logic in the ambient
language; see e.g. [21] for a framework that supports impera-
tive, but non-probabilistic, program logics in Coq. The general
purpose proof assistant Coq has been used to verify crypto
protocols in the foundational cryptography framework [26]
and in the verification of an OpenSSL implementation of
HMAC [9]. A similar library could be built in F*, as suggested
in [10]. This would have the added benefit of a build-in SMT
solver.
Wysteria is a domain specific language for MPC. It has
been embedded [28] in the F ∗ programming language/proof
assistant. Various protocols have been verified in Wysteria∗
to be secure against a passive adversary. However, all the
cryptographic primitives are treated axiomatically as F ∗ does
not include probabilistic computation. In this paper, we treat all
the aspects, consider active security and treat the multiplication
protocol.
A simulation-based proof for two parties has been for-
malized in the Isabelle proof assistant [14], based on
CryptHOL [24]. The logic of Isabelle is similar to EasyCrypts
ambient logic. However, Isabelle lacks built-in pHoare logics.
They use a shallow embedding of a probabilistic programming
language into Isabelle using a monadic interpretation. This is
less powerful than the deep embedding used in Certicrypt [7],
and implicitly in EasyCrypt. In Isabelle, they prove security
against a passive (semi-honest) adversary of a two-party mul-
tiplication protocol using simulation based proofs. In contrast,
we prove security of a much more complicated protocol that
is secure against an active adversary and works for n-parties.
This requires us to model the adversary abstractly using
EasyCrypts modules system, and we thus have the harder job
to reason about imperative code. Importantly, we also provide
new proof techniques that are more amenable to automation,
as they are close to the proof techniques used for program
logics.
CryptoVerif [12] is an automatic protocol verifier. It targets
different goals than EasyCrypt and is complementary to it.
Indeed, CryptoVerif aims to automate cryptographic game
transformations. It applies a collection of game transforma-
tions, using a full automatic proof strategy that can be driven
by users’ hints. On the other hand, EasyCrypt, relies on
an embedding of Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic that
subsumes cryptographic games transformations. Its logic being
relatively complete, it can be used to prove various properties
about a large class of cryptographic primitives. Although we
have not tried it, we are very doubtful that Maurer’s proof can
be reconstructed automatically.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Easycrypt
The EasyCrypt logic and module system were a good fit to
express these protocols in a natural way, once we found the
right way of modelling it.
In our experience, developing in EasyCrypt is fairly pleas-
ant. The combination of interactive theorem proving using the
ssreflect language combined with automatic theorem proving
(SMT) is very powerful. Unfortunately, at the moment the
SMT-solver does not provide information which lemmas were
used unlike e.g. [22]. This information could be used to speed
up checking the document (which currently takes a couple of
minutes), but also be used to prove similar lemmas. Many uses
of SMT could be avoided by using a more expressive type
system. In particular, good support for (coersive) subtyping
would have been helpful. Since much of the low-level proving
is automated, leaving out simple type information will often
result in the SMT-solver failing without further information.
In this case, it would be helpful to provide a counterexample
to the user. This functionality is provided by a number of
SMT-solvers and also by quickcheck. EasyCrypt’s pWhile
language does not support iterators (for-loops). Most of our
constructions are iterations over the list of parties. Our first
modelling consisted of growing lists by a while loop. We have
found it is more convenient to start the loop with an array with
default values and update during the while loop.
Finally, we spent much time on the whiteboard trying to
connect the code for modelling communication with our visual
representation of matrices. A simple evaluator for functional
programs would have been useful.
B. Future work
We have proved the security against one corrupted party.
The same methodology works for more corrupted parties, as
we can just give more information to the adversary, using
EasyCrypt’s module system. We would make a predicate
Honest on the interval [0..N). Our current formalization
checks if the current party i equals advid. Instead we would
check Honest i. Currently only the information of one party
is sent to the adversary (an EasyCrypt module). Instead, we
would send the information of all the corrupted parties to the
adversary. Like in the current protocol, all the corrupted parties
would move last.
It would be interesting to code arithmetical circuits
in EasyCrypt. This would be an effort similar to
the encoding of multivariate polynomials in Coq
(https://github.com/math-comp/multinomials).
From a higher perspective, it would be very interesting to
formally connect our work with an efficient implementation,
as is done in high-assurance crypto [1].
C. Conclusion
We have presented new security definitions for active se-
curity of MPC protocols, shown that they imply the standard
ones and formalized the security proof in EasyCrypt. This is
the first formalized protocol with a proof of active security
and the first one for n-parties.
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